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Abstract—The growth of Internet use due to the emergence 
of new paradigms including social media and the Internet of 
Things (IoT) has presented several challenges. Within the IoT 
paradigm, there are several domain-specific challenges, among 
which security is crucial. Billions of devices in the IoT ecosystem 
have the responsibility of generating, processing, and analyzing 
large volumes of data. This data may connect with organizations, 
services, billions of people and other devices. This high level of 
interconnectivity creates a complex, heterogeneous, network 
which is challenging to adequately secure. IoT devices are smart, 
diverse, portable, interoperable, often autonomous and deployed 
in distributed topology.  
Properly managing the identities of these IoT devices plays a 
critical role in achieving the security of the overall IoT 
ecosystem.  Notably, existing identity management systems fail to 
satisfy the requirements of identity management for IoT devices. 
We present a novel solution for IoT devices identity management 
based on self-sovereign identity and underpinned by proven 
security offered by distributed ledger technology. This novel 
approach provides a secure, portable, decentralized, persistent, 
unique, interoperable, self-owned and controlled identity. A 
Device’s identity with all its relationships in the IoT system are 
securely managed throughout its entire lifecycle.  
 
Keywords— Digital Identity, Internet of things, self-sovereign 
identity, Distributed Ledger Technology, blockchain, IoT security.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the rapid growth of millions of online services, billions 
of users and devices, digital identities have become complex 
and difficult to manage (1). As the Internet of Things (IoT) 
paradigm is growing in scale and scope leading to different 
interactions among devices, services, and people. This is 
creating less secure communication and inadequate 
authenticity of information in the IoT ecosystem. As a result 
of this the IoT ecosystem became challenging to achieve 
security, scalability, availability, and usability.  
A key pillar of security is a robust identity management 
systems wherein users, devices, services and organizations 
that interact over the Internet need to be represented by a 
digital identity (2). An IDentity Management System (IDMS) 
is a framework with a set of rules used to commission, manage 
and retire digital identities. Digital identities uniquely identify 
a subject in a given context, enabling interaction, 
anonymously or non-anonymously between secure subjects. 
IDMS leverage a combination of many technologies but it can 
be grouped in to four main elements: Service Provider(SP), 
IDentity Provider (IDP), identity verifier and identity 
subject/user (3). The SP, sometimes called a relying party, is 
an entity that provides services to entities like end users and 
things. An IDP is an entity whose role is to create, manage, 
maintain, and maintain credentials and asserting issued 
credentials of subscribers (users) during authentication (4). 
Identity verifier has the role of checking the correctness of 
user’s identities provided by the SP and decides its validity. A 
user in the general term, is the client of both SP and IDP about 
whom claim is assigned for. Identity holder could be a range 
of participants within an IoT ecosystem including; a person, 
an organization, an application software (service) or an IoT 
device.  
Existing IDMSs rely on a single centralized authority which 
has insecure authenticity, limited scalability, represents a 
single point of failure, suffers from non-persistent availability 
of services and is susceptible to identity theft (5). Moreover, 
mobility of devices, their dynamic topology, diversified 
functionality, unstandardized protocols, and missing inherent 
security of IoT devices during manufacturing worsen the 
security challenge in the entire IoT system (6)(7). Some recent 
and emerging decentralized identity-based IDMSs address 
some IoT-related identity problems but are limited in their 
approach focusing on human identities, scalability and 
performance issues. Thus, IoT devices require a new digital 
identity mechanism that can overcome these challenges and 
provide suitable identity management requirements in the IoT 
system. This research investigated existing IDMSs and 
identifies problems and opportunities with respect to IoT 
device identity management requirements and then developed 
a novel a solution.  
II. RELATED WORK  
Existing IDMSs could be categorized into two domains, 
traditional and decentralized in operation. The traditional 
IDMSs are mainly dependent on a centralized IDP which 
performs all operations of creating, updating, managing, and 
deleting identities across their lifecycle. Recently developed 
decentralized IDMSs have deficiencies in addressing the 
identity requirements of IoT solutions due to scalability, 
performance, and storage capacity issues in addition to being 
primarily developed for human identities (8). However, in the 
IoT systems, IoT devices comprise most of the identities. 
Thus, this section analyzes contemporary traditional and 
decentralized model IDMSs and identifies deficiencies which 
may be addressed. 
A. Traditional Identity Management Systems  
In traditional IDMSs, the credentials of all users are stored in 
the IDP. and When users need access to services, they request 
the SPs and the IDP determine whether to grant or deny access 
(3). In this model identity owners have limited or even no 
control of their own identities and they are dependent on the 
consent of the IDPs/SPs for any access to services they need 
and changes they made. Moreover, identity owners can be 
denied services, and their identities can even be taken away 
completely (9).  One main core element of the traditional 
IDMSs is the Public key infrastructure (PKI). PKI is a 
framework that consists a set of roles, policies, and procedures 
aiming at issuing, managing, validating and distributing 
certificates and public-private keys. The conventional PKI is 
a centralized system used as a means of secure authentication 
on the Internet. It issues certificates to users through 
Certificate Authority (CA), maintains, backups and revokes 
public keys. PKI may use a certificate standard, such as X.509, 
to manage public keys together with a trusted third party CA 
that verifies ownership of the public keys  (11). The X.509 
standard defines the certificate format and maps public keys 
to the identities of the key holder. The CA asserts this binding 
by digitally signing each certificate based on the validity of 
the private certificate holder. However, PKI relies on 
centralized trusted party CAs that defines identities by 
themselves. This denies control and ownership of identities to 
the owners and opens ways to several attacks. Traditional 
identity management systems may be realized through 4 
general approaches as discussed in sections 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
1) Isolated Model 
In the isolated model, both SP and IDP roles are consolidated 
and provided as a single service encapsulating both roles (9). 
As the Internet grows with many online services and billions 
of IoT devices along with a large volume of identities, the 
isolated model is incapable of providing scalable, secure and 
appropriate service to users and things. Moreover, users may 
need to manage hundreds, or in some cases thousands, of 
different credentials leading to mismanaging identities, 
password reuse and forgetting credentials. This increases the 
attack surface for individuals and introduces associated risks 
related to theft and reuse of identity parameters, such as the 
issues posed by disclosure of inadequately protected password 
representations.  
2) Centralized Identity Model 
Unlike the isolated model, the centralized identity model 
detaches the SP from the IDP making them function as 
separate roles(9). In this model a single IDP stores, issues and 
manages all user identities from multiple SPs. The IDP of this 
model implements Single Sign-On (SSO) which provide 
access to users of multiple SPs using same credentials with a 
one-time login. SSO implementation on centralized model 
differs from federated model (3). In the centralized identity 
management model SSO functions within a single security 
domain where the IDP and multiple SPs are governed by a 
single policy under a single authority (12). This model is 
preferred over the isolated model as it reduces the number of 
user identities. However, it is facing many challenges such as 
being a single point of failure, unscalable and targets of many 
vulnerabilities and attacks.  
3) Federated Identity Model 
Federated identity model brings multiple SPs/IDPs operating 
in different security domains into a federation by establishing 
a trusted relationship built on a set of standards and 
technologies (13). In this model, user identity is mapped to 
different domains allowing authentication after an IDP and 
grants access to multiple services using the same login 
credentials within the federation (14). This provides users 
more accessible management over their identities as compared 
to centralized model. The federated operation in this model is 
achieved by implementing a cross-domain SSO (15). 
Implementation of SSO is to function in cross domain of the 
federation. Federated identify based solutions face a number 
of challenges such as misusing identity data, inflexible 
identity update or modification, inconsistent and faulty 
identity revocation mechanisms. The federated identity model 
is still centralized and controlled by a few IDPs. Moreover, 
federated identity leads to less security trust as users are forced 
to form a relationship with a third party that they cannot 
completely trust.  
4) User-Centric Identity Model 
As services and domains grows authentication and 
authorization in the federated identity model become more. 
The three models previously explored are designed based on 
SP/IDPs’ perspectives while lacking full ownership and 
control of identities for users (16). To address these 
drawbacks, a user-centric identity model was proposed to 
improve user experience and enhance security and privacy. 
This approach allows users to store their identity in their own 
domain, facilitating control. Users can store and manage their 
identities from different domains in their trusted personal 
authentication devices such as smart cards or smartphones 
(17) and decide with whom identity-related information and 
how it should be disclosed to a SP (18). However, the user-
centric identity model relies on centralized IDPs for its full 
functionality like the previous three models and shares some 
of their drawbacks.  
From the analysis performed, traditional identity management 
models are facing many challenges and are not suitable for use 
within an IoT ecosystem due to vital deficiencies. The major 
deficiencies include reliance on a centralized architecture, 
susceptibility to common attacks, inability to scale to IoT 
requirements, lack of compliance, and operating in a non-
transparent manner.  
B. Decentralized Identity Model   
The decentralized identity model originates and focuses on 
identity owner independent of any permissions from a central 
authority. This is an emerging identity model that Distributed 
Ledger Technology (DLT) in tandem with the concept of Self 
Sovereign Identity (SSI). DLT is analogous to a database 
which securely records and performs chronological 
transactions, in a peer-to-peer decentralized network (19). In 
DLT a transaction record is maintained by all the participants. 
On the contrary, in conventional traditional systems a 
transaction record is stored in a single central authority (20). 
In the case of IDMS, DLT eliminates the need for 
intermediary entities such as IDPs and SPs enabling 
participants hold copies of identical data updated with 
consensus mechanism. In addition, DLT has more basic 
features that solve some of the problems of IoT devices 
identities such as single point of failure, provable high 
security and privacy, identity owner consent-based 
information sharing, and provides portable identity.  
SSI is a decentralized identity model that provides identity 
holders full ownership, control, and management over their 
identities (21). This is achieved independent of any 
centralized authority which can be realized by DLT. In most 
current developments, different enterprises use blockchain to 
address the challenges that their IoT systems are facing in the 
IDMS arena. Blockchain is the most widely used technology 
among the DLT types that led to many innovations beyond the 
financial industry. Blockchain is a decentralized peer-to-peer 
network unlike the traditional centralized (client-server) 
architecture, based on an append-only DLT. Decentralization, 
integrity, immutability, non-reputability, anonymity and 
transparency features of the blockchain can address the 
distributed, heterogenous, portability and security 
requirements of the IoT ecosystem, mainly the identity 
management. IDMSs that are implemented and leverage SSI 
principles and blockchain are examined in sections 1,2 and 3.   
1) uPort 
uPort (22) is based on the SSI concept implemented on the  
Ethereum blockchain technology. uPort aimed to provide a 
decentralized identity framework that works with next-
generation Decentralized applications (Dapps) and traditional 
centralized applications such as banking and email.  uPort 
uses Ethereum smart contracts by addressing them with 
unique persistent identifiers. uPort’s controller module 
manages the digital identity and users use a recovery module 
to retrieve their authentication credentials from the list of 
delegates that the controller holds. Delegates are entities 
(individuals or institutions) that the identity owner chose as 
delegates. The Ethereum uses the concept of Proxy which 
serve as addresses of smart contracts representing persistent 
identifiers for the users. The deficiencies of uPort include 
insecure delegates of a user as they are available publicly on 
the blockchain, inability of the mobile app to store more than 
one identity, and unencrypted message communicated 
between an application and messaging server.   
2) Hyperledger Indy 
Hyperledger Indy is an open-source collaborative blockchain 
platform   whose development is led by the Linux Foundation. 
This has been purposely designed to provide decentralized 
identity management and works in a cross-domain 
environment (23). It aims at providing private and secure 
identity management with full ownership and control for users 
over their identity and decides on sharing and disclosure based 
on their consent. Indy’s design is mainly human identity based 
and does not properly address the identity of devices.   
3) ADEPT  
Autonomous Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Telemetry (ADEPT) 
uses BitTorrent for file-sharing, Ethereum as smart-contracts 
handling and TeleHash for peer-to-peer messaging (24). 
ADEPT aims in realizing device autonomy by enabling them 
verify transactions among themselves without the need for 
any central authority. As the consensus mechanism, it uses a 
combination of proof-of-work and proof-of-stake. IBM in 
partnership with Samsung is undertaking this research and 
only the proof of concept of ADEPT unveiled (24). ADEPT is 
not based on SSI and the identity management mechanism is 
not explicitly stated.   
Although blockchain solves some of the problems of IDMSs 
it faces a number of challenges. The first drawback of 
blockchain is the scalability issue which happens as its 
network expands. The scalability issue is exacerbated when 
applied to an IoT which may contain billions of devices. 
Secondly, blockchain lacks performance due to transaction 
latencies, synchronization, and growing large amounts of 
data. Storage capacity is another challenge while using 
blockchain with resource-constrained IoT devices making 
them incapable of storing a large number of transactions (25). 
Derived from on the analysis made on the traditional and 
decentralized IDMSs the following research issues are 
identified: i) How may the identity of the IoT devices being 
managed with a decentralized IDMS? ii) How to design and 
implement an IDMS considering the distributed nature of the 
IoT ecosystem? iii) How is it possible to design an IDMS that 
has a trust score algorithm applicable to resource-constrained 
IoT devices? iv) How is it possible to design a cross-platform 
IDMS that handles all IoT device types of different 
manufacturers with their portability and native features? 
Finally, v) With growing vulnerabilities and attacks on the IoT 
system, how is the identity of IoT devices secured?   
A novel solution which addresses these deficiencies and 
research questions is presented in Section III.  
III. A NOVEL, DECENTRALIZED, SELF-SOVEREIGN 
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SOLUTION  
Many of the existing identity management systems primarily 
focus on managing user identities. However, almost all online 
communications performed among digital actors 
fundamentally involve devices. Many new technologies and 
business operations are expanding the demands of thousands 
of IoT devices to serve central roles in a variety of use cases. 
However, they currently operate in an insecure environment 
consisting of various vulnerabilities due to unpatched devices, 
weak passwords, physical compromise, lack of proper single 
and multifactor authentication and lack of fundamental 
security features during manufacturing to mention some. This 
makes IoT devices themselves potentially internal threats and 
attack vectors. Thus, IoT devices need a secure identity 
management system that satisfies scalability, security, 
portability, and self-controlled and owned identity in a 
decentralized environment. Thus, the main goal of our 
solution is to overcome these challenges and satisfy the 
requirements of IDMS in IoT systems.  As explained in the 
‘decentralized identity model’ section blockchain is not a 
preferred solution for IoT devices, especially for resource-
constrained devices, considering the scalability, performance, 
and storage capacity challenges that it is facing. To overcome 
these limitations of blockchain, a number of other new DLT 
modes are undergoing development. Tangle is one of these 
new models which is developed by IOTA as an alternative to 
blockchain fundamentally focusing on IoT (26).  
Tangle incorporates a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) based 
DLT developed with the main goals of reducing or eliminating 
transaction overhead and removing block size limit treating 
each transaction thus enhancing transaction rates. Moreover, 
the Tangle protocol merges transaction maker and validator 
roles enabling a node capable of both making and validating 
transactions (27). When a node wishes to add transactions to 
the tangle network, it should validate the previous two 
transactions eliminating the block and chaining process to 
enhance performance and scalability (28). In addition, tangle 
allows parallel validation of transactions, unlike blockchains. 
As the number of nodes increases, the validation rate of 
transactions increases. Tangle has no concept of miners and 
allows feeless transactions. These features make it highly 
scalable, performant and storage efficient DLT solution 
compared to blockchain. Tangle is also developed to be 
quantum attack resistant as it uses stronger encryption 
algorithm called Winternitz One-Time signature scheme to 
generate its public addresses. As a result of these and other 
related important advantages for IoT system, we have chosen 
tangle as the underpinning DLT for this work.  
This work has the following four main contributions: 
i) Building a DLT-based device profiling mechanism which 
involves registration of IoT devices, identifier assignment, 
issuance and assertion of verifiable claims. ii) Design and 
development of a trust score algorithm suitable for IoT 
devices identity management. iii) Developing risk mitigation 
and management mechanism to identify, categorize, and 
manage risks that can occur on the IDMS of IoT systems and 
sets countermeasures. iv) Developing a trust revocation 
mechanism that takes actions which include revoking trust, 
denying privileges, revoking public keys and identifiers, and 
invalidating verifiable claims.     
 
Fig. 1. Develped architecture 
   Verifiable credentials (or claims) are sets of identity 
attributes that contains a cryptographically proof asserted by 
a certifying entity. Entities can share their own claims to prove 
self-identity without the need for sharing identity information 
which have greater level of privacy. The developed 
architecture as depicted in Figure 1, uses tangle as a 
foundation for the four main components of this solution: 
DLT based device profiling, a trust score algorithm, risk 
mitigation and management, and trust revocation mechanism 
which are briefly discussed in sub-sections A, B, C and D.  
A. DLT Based IoT Device Profiling 
Device profiling involves device enrollment, generating an 
identifier, generating public and private keys, and issuing and 
asserting verifiable claims. The identifier is generated using 
DLT independent of any centralized entity (registry, IDP or 
certificate authority). The Decentralized Identifier (DID) (29) 
from W3C Standard will be used to achieve decentralization, 
global resolvability, verifiability, secure and self-controlled 
features of an identifier. This enables IoT devices to fully own 
and manage their identifiers without relying on any 
centralized entity and can be used anywhere, anytime and in 
any environment. These identifiers are cryptographically tied 
to public keys and ownership is verified with the private key 
holding it. Following identifier mapping, the device is issued 
a verifiable claim which are proofs about the devices 
themselves. Claims or attestations for the devices can be 
issued by manufacturers, distributors/resellers, owners or 
administrators. The DLT based verifiable claims have curtail 
advantages in that they are scalable, allow minimum 
disclosure of identity information, immutable, and are truly 
owned by the devices themselves. The identifier and verifiable 
claim implemented on DLT provides a cryptographically 
signed tamper-proof identity for IoT devices.   
B. Trust Score Algorithm 
The TLS/SSL based web works based on the hierarchical 
centralized Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to determine 
trusted certificates. Validating these certificates follows the 
chain path validation starting from the client browser to the 
root certificate authority. In this mechanism, the trust anchors 
like the browser developers and the certificate issuers are 
considered as trusted since their trustworthiness cannot be 
proofed. PKI’s centralized nature leads to a single point of 
failure, limited scalability, and susceptibility to a number of 
attacks.  
One such decentralized form of PKI implementation is the 
web of trust where users designate others as trusted by signing 
their public keys. As a result, a user stores his public key 
digitally signed by the entities that they trusted him. Others 
trust his certificates if they are able to verify that the certificate 
contains the signature of someone he or she trusts. Web of 
trust is preferred as it eliminates a single point of failure and 
builds involving multiple entities in a decentralized 
environment. Most IoT devices have vulnerabilities which 
may include weak passwords, lack of encryption, and design 
which does not incorporate fundamental security paradigms. 
Thus, adapting the web of trust for IoT devices solves many 
of the security problems they have through its decentralized, 
interoperable and secure features. As such, the trust score 
algorithm in this work will be built based on the basic concept 
of the web of trust. In addition, other parameters like 
minimum security requirements, reputation and compliances 
will be part of the trust score algorithm.  
C. Risk Mitigation and Management Mechanism 
Although there is a secure identity management system in 
place for IoT devices, there exists a risk in the IoT system like 
lack of fundamental security features during manufacturing. 
Moreover, as IoT devices involve in the collection of 
observational data from the physical environment, the data 
can originally be a victim of noise, bias, sensor drift, or 
manipulated by a malicious entity (30). The risk mitigation 
and management mechanism in this work handles these and 
other related risks along with the IDMS.  Thus, properly 
authenticated devices may not always behave properly in the 
IoT ecosystem. A number of other risks include the inability 
to update firmware on time, technological advancements, 
growth, and nature of attacks, and other issues. Our risk 
mitigation and management system aims at discovering and 
mitigating different types of risks and ensures that these risks 
are reduced to an acceptable level. It also ensures that risks are 
properly managed and appropriate countermeasures are taken 
based on mitigated, identified, categorized and corresponding 
outcomes.  
D. Trust Revocation Mechanism 
A secure backup and recovery mechanism is vital in securing 
private keys and the overall IDMS of the IoT system. This 
mechanism will be designed to securely back up the private 
keys of IoT devices to another device, user or agent that it 
trusts and restoring them securely when required. The trust 
score of an IoT device is associated with its public key which 
intern is bound to its global and unique identifier. The risk and 
mitigation management method handles risks and when any 
abnormalities that lead to a harmful act happens, it informs the 
trust revocation mechanism to take actions. The risk 
mitigation and management system informs the trust 
revocation system to take proper actions on devices being 
identified ways to vulnerabilities and attacks in the IoT 
system. Depending on the level of identified risks the trust 
revocation system may revoke the trust score, public keys and 
identifiers and invalidate the verifiable claims of the victim 
devices.   
IV. USE CASE SCENARIO: CAR RENTAL INDUSTRY 
The car rental industry provides automobile renting services 
to customers on a temporary basis which may range from a 
few hours to months or as  per kilometre basis. A customer 
could be a traveller, tourist, or individuals who don’t have 
their own car. The global car rental market is growing 
following remarkable urbanization, world population growth, 
effect of environmental pollution, and high traffic congestion. 
This coupled with extensive industrialization, government 
restrictions regarding private car ownerships and high cost 
makes it difficult for individuals to buy and drive own car. The 
emergence of technologies such as smart phones and IoT is 
advancing the car rental industry. Existing car rental process 
is highly centralized relying mainly on the car rental 
companies which suffered from different attacks, single point 
of failure, limited scalability, and lack of information 
integrity. Moreover, the existing car rental industry involves 
laborious rental process, high costs and limited vehicle choice.  
Implementing a secure self-sovereign DLT based 
decentralized identity in the car rental industry enables fraud-
proof, self-owned and controlled identities, eliminate central 
monopoly of all information and reduces the overhead cost. 
Moreover, the identifiers, verifiable credentials, consents and 
overall history of car rental companies, cars, customers, 
insurances, banks and other stakeholders are transparent and 
auditable in the DLT network. Finally, the DLT based 
decentralized self-sovereign IDMS generally brings improved 
service, reduced cost, easy monitoring, access and 
information sharing consistently about the identities of all 
participants of the DLT network. The architecture for this use 
case is shown in figure 2 below.  
 
Fig. 2. Destributed, Secure SSI Mangement for Car Rental Industry Use 
Case  
Figure 2 shows the high overview of the architecture for the 
car rental industry. It starts with device profiling (car), 
customer, car owner and other stakeholders detail registration 
(which could be optional if it is done already). Car rental 
agency, car owner, customer and the car generate an identifier 
from the blockchain and request verifiable identifiers from the 
issuers. The verifiable credentials can be a driving license, 
passport, bank account, insurance, certificate of ownership, 
and car’s license plate number to mention some. Legitimate 
issuers provide the verifiable claim to the identity holders and 
are used for different services up on the verification by the 
service providers. Identifiers and verifiable claims are 
transparent and publicly verifiable in the DLT and sharing of 
identity information depends on the consent of the identity 
owner where they can fully or partially disclose them. Partial 
discloser can be not specifying the exact amount of money in 
the bank, and date of birth among many others. The trust score 
algorithm, risk mitigation and management, and trust 
revocation will be implemented as explained in III.  
V. CONCLUSION  
This study presents a novel solution which aims to overcome 
the identity management problems of devices in the IoT 
system. The traditional and current IDMSs which are not 
capable of addressing the current and growing demands of the  
identity management in the IoT ecosystem are addressed by 
the developed solution. This SSI based IDMS is implemented 
on the underpinning decentralized DLT technology, 
incorporating tangle technology. In the presented solution, 
IoT devices have full ownership and control over their 
identities via a portable, interoperable, persistent, secure and 
scalable system. This research has an ongoing active and 
future work with the following summary points: i) Device 
profiling compatible with DLT and SSI which include device 
enrolment, generating a unique identifier, device to identifier 
mapping, issuing, asserting and validating verifiable claims. 
ii) Analysis and design of trust score algorithm for IoT devices 
based on the web of trust, reputation and other factors. iii) 
Building risk mitigation and management that detects, 
identifies, categorizes and manages risks related to IDMS. iv) 
Developing a trust management system that revokes granted 
trust score, public keys, and associated identifiers based on 
mitigated and identified risks, life cycle and related issues of 
the IoT devices.    
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